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Abstract 
Along with the progress of low-carbon economy, it becomes a common topic around the world to reduce high-carbon 
energy consumption and decrease greenhouse gases emission. At early stage, providing subsidies (e.g., cash, tax 
allowance) based on upgrading cost is an effective approach for government to induce enterprises to ameliorate 
production mode and innovate technologies, which may also cause enterprises to pursue more subsidies by false cost 
report. How can we design models to get incentive compatibility between subsidies and honest cost report? Models 
based on the principal-agent theory were built to achieve the goal in this paper, and they were proved by 
mathematical reasoning not only to meet the need of policy inducing but also to make enterprise declare their low - 
carbon upgrading cost honestly. The theoretical result was also verified by a simulation example in this paper. 
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1. Introduction   
In the background of global climate warming, science community and government have already 
reached an agreement that low-carbon economy is one of the most effective approaches to avoid 
catastrophic climate change and maintain human sustainable development. However it is a gradual 
process for a country to realise a low-carbon economy. Usually government provides enterprises with 
subsidies at the beginning of  low-carbon economy to help them upgrade production mode and innovate 
technologies because those enterprises have to purchase new raw materials or construct new production 
line, which will cost them a lot of money. Government subsidies vary from cash to tax allowance. 
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Although low-carbon subsidies based on enterprise’ upgrading cost may encourage enterprises to join in 
the activity of low-carbon quickly, a  big problem still exists. The information between government and 
enterprises is not symmetrical, that is, enterprises have more informat ion of upgrading cost than 
government, and enterprises may declare their upgrading cost falsely  to achieve more subsidies. It  is a  
dilemma. Then is there a method which can not only rap idly mobilize enterprises to join in  low-carbon 
activities but also make them declare cost honestly? The problem can be solved by the following models. 
2. Principal-agent theory 
As we discussed above, the information between government and enterprises is not symmetrical. In 
informat ion economics the party who has more informat ion is called agent and the other party wh o has 
less information is called principal. The interests of principal and agent are not consistent, so the agent 
may pursue his own benefit and harm the principal's interests. Usually the principal can not observe the 
agent’ activities, but he can observe the consequence of those activities. Therefore, the principal is faced 
with the problem how he rewards and punishes the agent according  to his observation to induce the agent’ 
action choice. According to  parameterized distribution formulat ion of Mirrlees and Holmstrom principal-
agent theory can be indicated as follows: 
If A  indicates the whole action p rofile of an agent, we assume a ( a A ) indicates one of the agent’ 
actions (e.g., the agent’ endeavour degree), T is a random exogenous variable not controlled by the 
principal and the agent, 4 indicates the numeric area of T  and ( )G T  represents the distribution function 
of T ,whose density function is denoted as ( , , )f x aS . a and T  jo intly determine observable result of 
( , )x a T (such as enterprise’ profit) and revenue function ( , )aS T . ( , )aS T is a strictly increasing concave 
function of a  and a strictly increasing convex function of T ( a higher T  means a more favourable  
condition). The principal now faces with a problem that he should design a contract )(xs to reward or 
punish the agent according to x ( the result of the principal’s observation), which prompt the agent to 
modify his actions to meet the principal’ need. 
Here  V s xSª º¬ ¼  and    U s x c aª º¬ ¼ indicate expect utility functions of the principal and the agent 
separately, and c indicates the cost of the agent’s action of a . According to the general characteristics of 
expected utility functions and the law of diminishing marg inal utility, we will 
get ' 0, '' 0V V! d , ' 0, '' 0U U! d , ' 0, '' 0c c! ! . If the target of principal is to achieve the expected utility 
optimization through his selection of a and ( )s x , the models can be denoted as follows:  
   max , ,
, ( )
V s x f x a dx
a s x
S Sf ª º³ ¬ ¼f  
[ ( )] ( , , ) ( )                                                                  
. .
' ' '[ ( )] ( , , ) ( ) [ ( )] ( , , ) ( )       
U s x f x a dx c a U
s t
U s x f x a dx c a U s x f x a dx c a a A
S
S S
­ f  t³° f® f f°  t   ³ ³¯ f f
    
The first constraint condition, also named as participation constraint, means the agent will accept a 
commission when his expected utility under the mechanism made by the principal is not less than his 
opportunity utility which is determined by  the agent’s market  chance. The second constraint condition, 
also named as incentive constraint, means the agent will select the action to meet the principal’s need 
when his expected utility got by the principal’s desirable act ion  is not less than other action. Generally 
speaking, only it meets the two constraint conditions at the same time could the principal get positive 
cooperation of the agent. 
 3. Enterprise cost report model based on the asymmetric information 
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In terms of the principal-agent theory, the government can adjust enterprise’s behaviours through 
participation constraint and incentive constraint, and make it declare cost honestly. If an enterprise does 
not submit  it  cost to government, it will be forb idden to operate in the market and get no subsidies. 
Therefore, part icipation constraint is easy to meet. Now our task is to construct a mechanism to encourage 
enterprises to declare their upgrading cost honestly. 
For illustration, we need make some hypotheses as the prerequisite of the model. 
Hypothesis 1: Enterprises have more informat ion than government about their production cost, and 
they have motivation to cheat government to gain more profit. 
Hypothesis 2: The cost function, fixed cost and variable cost are denoted as  ,C q T , 0 1FC a a T   
and ( )0 1VC b b qT  . Here q  is product quantity and T  is a cost parameter which is well known by the 
manufacturing enterprise but not by government.  ,C q T  is a linear function about q  and T  which can 
be denoted as: 
( , ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1C q b b q a aT T T    ˈ 0q! ˈ 00a t ˈ 01a t ˈ 01b t ˈ 01b t  
Hypothesis 3: Although government is at a disadvantage on the enterprise’ upgrading cost, government 
is not blind. Government knows the prior p robability of cost parameter T  whose field, density function 
and cumulative d istribution function can be denoted as > @,0 1T T T , ( )f T (a continuous function about 
T and ( ) 0f T ! ) and ( )F T . 
Hypothesis 4: What government faces with is to select policy instrument to prompt  enterprises to 
declare their upgrading cost honestly. Assume that there are four policy instruments for government and 
'T ( > @' ,0 1T T T  ) is cost parameter declared by a business. Probability of permitting business operation, 
price, output and expected subsidies can be denoted as ( ')r T ǃ ( ')p T ǃ ( ')q T  and ( ')s T . 
ķ If probability of permitting business operation ( ')r T  is up to government evaluation accord ing to 
business action of pollution-reduction and its cost report, let  ' 1r T  indicate that a business action meets 
the needs and  ' 0r T  is the opposite. 
ĸThe market is efficient and the portfolio of p rice ---output meets the conditions of market 
equilibrium. So we will get ( ') ( ( '))p P qT T  . 
Hypothesis 5: Demand function is common knowledge for government and the enterprise, which 
means both the enterprise and government know market demand informat ion and they know the opposite 
side also knows the information. 
This paper only takes into account that government permits business operation, that is    ' 1r rT T  . 
As we know, the business expected profit under the circumstance of true cost report equals the sum of 
operation profit plus expected subsidies, which can be denoted as  
> @( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1p q b b q a a sS T T T T T T T                                                                                        (1) 
Similarly, when the real cost parameter is T  while the business declared it 'T , the business expected 
profit is 
( ', ) [ ( ') ( ') ( ) ( ') ] ( ')0 1 0 1p q b b q a a sS T T T T T T T T                                                                                  (2) 
According to incentive constraint, for > @,0 1T T T  the business expected profit ( )S T  ( ( ) 0S T t ) meets the 
condition 
( ) max ( ', )S T S T T 
                                                                                                                              (3) 
We’ll get  ',S T T  based on the formulas (1) and (2) 
           
             
     
', ' ' ' '0 1 0 1
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '0 1 0 1 1 1
' ' '1 1
p q b b q a a s
p q b b q a a s b q a
b q a
S T T T T T T T T
T T T T T T T T T
S T T T T
ª º     ¬ ¼
        ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ª º   ¬ ¼
                                                          (4) 
Then we’ll get the following relation based on the formulas (3) and (4) 
         ', ' ' '1 1b q aS T S T T S T T T Tt    ª º¬ ¼                                                                                              (5) 
If we swap ,T Tc of the formulas (4) and (5), we’ll get the following relation: 
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, ' '1 1b q aS T T S T T T T   ª º¬ ¼                                                                                                        (6)          ' , ' '1 1b q aS T S T T S T T T Tt    ª º¬ ¼                                                                                              (7) 
When government considers the subsidy policy, it should subject to formulas (5) and (7), and then 
we’ll get the following relation: 
           ' ' ' '1 1 1 1b q a b q aT T T S T S T T T T  d  d  ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼                                                                            (8) 
According to formula (8),  
If 'T Tt , ( ) ( )1 1 1 1b q a b q aT Tc t  ; if 'T Td , ( ) ( )1 1 1 1b q a b q aT Tc d  .  
Then we’ll draw a conclusion that formula ( )1 1b q aT 
 
is a non-increasing function about T
. 
BecauseT is continuously differentiab le in the region of > @,0 1T T , we let formula (8) div ided by 'T T  
and taken a limit ing process 'T To . Now accord ing to Squeeze Theorem, we’ll get  
formula    ' ' '1 1b q aS T T  ª º¬ ¼ . For the randomicity of 'T , we can get formula    ' 1 1b q aS T T  ª º¬ ¼                                                                                                                             (9) 
Formula (4) can be transformed as follows: 
       
         
', ' ' '1 1
' ' '1 1
b q a
b q a
S T T S T T T T
S T S T S T T T T
ª º   ¬ ¼ª º ª º     ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
                                                                                         (10) 
According to Mean Value Theorem of Integrals, there will be a point [  which meets the following 
request: 
    > @' ' '( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1b q aS T S T S [ T T [ T Tc                                                                                               (11) 
If formula (11) is put into formula (10), we’ll get 
   
'
' ' '( , ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ') ( ' )1 1 1 1
b q a d b q a
b q a b q a
TS T T S T T T T T TT
S T [ T T T
ª º     ³ « »¬ ¼ª º     ¬ ¼
 
Because formula ( )1 1b q aT 
 
is a  non-increasing function about T
 
we can get the following 
relation [( ( ) ) ( ( ') )]( ' ) 01 1 1 1b q a b q a[ T T T    t , which is valid for any Tc andT .For ( ) 0S T t and ( , ) 0S T Tc t , we 
can safely draw a conclusion that ( , ) ( )S T T S Tc d is always valid. 
Conclusion: From what we have testified above, the conditions that the profit of false cost report is less 
than honest cost report are:  
   
   
' 1
( ) 0
( ) a no increasing function about1 1
'( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ') ( ' )1 1 1 1
r r
b q a
b q a b q a
T T
S T
T
S T T S T [ T T T
­   ° t°® °°      ª º¬ ¼¯
ˈ  
4. Analogue computation 
Assume that enterprise’s product price is closely related with variab le cost and can offset its variable 
cost, that is, price can be denoted as ( )0 1p b bO Tc    ( 1O! ). 
Assume that demand function of the product and subsidy function can be separately denoted as 
 q p m np   ( 0, 0m n! ! ) and 1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]0 1 1 1s a a b q a dTT T T TT   ³ . Here T ( > @,0 1T T T )  represents the true cost 
parameter and 'T ˄ > @,0 1T T Tc ˅represents declaration cost parameter. 
We make an analogue computation by the model above. 
In order to simplify  model, we let 01 0b a  , 11a  , and then we’ll get the cost function ( , ) 0C q b qT T  . 
Which means government knows variable costs per unit of production instead of fixed cost. Now 
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government has four policy instruments including probability of permitting business operation ( ') 1 r T  , 
price ( ') 0p bT O , output ( ') ( ( '))q q pT T  and expected subsidies ' ' 1( ) 1
'
s dTT T T TT   ³ . 
According to formula (1), the profit under the circumstance of true cost report is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 10 0 1
p q b b q a a s
p b q s b
S T T T T T T T
T T T T O O T T
ª º     ¬ ¼
ª º       ¬ ¼ ˄PQ S˅ ˈ 
According to formula (2), the profit under the circumstance of false cost report is 
( ', ) [ ( ') ( ') ( ) ( ') ] ( ')0 1 0 1
( ') ( ') ( ') ( 1) ( )0 0 0 1
p q b b q a a s
p b q s b m n b
S T T T T T T T T
T T T T O O T T
     
ª º        ¬ ¼  
So we’ll get the result    ', 0S T S T T  , which means the profit under the circumstance of true cost 
report equals false cost report, and false cost report can’t bring extra profit to the enterprise. There is no 
incentive for enterprise to declare its upgrading cost falsely. Namely cost report model based on the 
mechanis m of low-carbon subsidies not only shows low-carbon guidance of government but also 
encourages enterprise to declare upgrading cost honestly.  
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